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I. INTRODUCTION
On its face, the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act'
is a straightforward statute governing the procedure of payment of
employee wages. The Wage Act establishes certain time requirements
and prohibits practices such as paying wages in other than "lawful
money of the United States." 2 However, as the rights of the American
worker continue to be enhanced,3 state statutes like the Wage Payment
and Collection Act are subjected to the expansive interpretation of
activist courts.
Beginning with the 1981 decision in Farley v. Zapata Coal Cor-
poration,4 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has consis-
tently applied a liberal interpretation to the Wage Payment and Collec-
tion Act. As a result, the Wage Act has been transformed from a
compilation of simple wage payment requirements to a collection of
broad substantive rights. The Wage Act's assigned role as "remedial
1. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -16 (1989 & Supp. 1993). Independent statutory pro-
visions relating the use of polygraph tests by employers, and the discharge from employ-
ment of volunteer firemen and emergency service personnel also appears in the article gen-
erally referred to as the Wage Payment and Collection Act. See W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-5(a)
to -5(d) (1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-17 to -18 (1989). However, for purposes of this
article, references to the "Wage Payment and Collection Act' or the "Wage Act" shall
include §§ 21-5-1 to -16, and shall exclude the polygraph, firemen, and emergency service
personnel provisions, unless otherwise noted.
2. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-3 to -4 (1989).
3. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
2601 to 2654; Ameicans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213
(1991).
4. 281 S.E.2d 238 (W. Va. 1981).
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legislation designed to protect working people and assist them in the
collection of compensation wrongly withheld"5 has overrun the terms
of the Wage Act itself.
Pursuant to this broad policy, employee advocates constantly pur-
sue novel Wage Act theories both to avoid less advantageous state or
federal laws and to take advantage of the Wage Act's broad remedial
provisions, which include recovery of liquidated damages and
attorneys' fees. This article examines both the terms of the Wage
Payment and Collection Act and the trends in case law decided since
Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., analyzing the necessary limits of the
Wage Act and discussing issues that may be presented to the Supreme
Court of Appeals in the future.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE WAGE PAYMENT
AND COLLECTION ACT
The Wage Payment and Collection Act regulates the following
five main topics relating to the procedure of employee compensation:
(1) compensation of current employees; (2) compensation of former
employees; (3) bonding; (4) notification and recordkeeping; and (5)
enforcement and remedies. In addition, certain general terms and pro-
visions apply to all parts of the Wage Act. This section will identify
these general terms and provisions, and then discuss each of the five
main elements of the Wage Act.
A. General Terms and Provisions
The Wage Act generally applies to persons, firms, and corpora-
tions that employ employees. Although the Wage Act alternates using
the terms "person, firm or corporation," "person, firm or corporation
doing business in the state," 6 and "employer," these terms consistently
5. Jones v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 726, 730 (W. Va. 1988); Mullins
v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 869 (W. Va. 1982); Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp., 281 S.E.2d
238, 244 (W. Va. 1981).
6. The Wage Act's reference to "doing business in the state" is confusing because it
is not used in every instance and is not incorporated into the definition of any particular
term. In other words, the Wage Act uses the terms "person, firm or corporation" or "em-
1994]
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describe the relationship between an employing person or entity and an
employee, regardless of employer size or employee time of service.
Therefore, the appropriate term to refer to persons and entities to
which the Wage Act applies is "employer."
In addition, prime contractors may also become liable to employ-
ees other than their own under the Wage Act.8 For purposes of the
statute, a prime contractor is a person, firm, or corporation that con-
tracts with another for the performance of any work that the prime
contracting person has undertaken to perform for another.9 Such a
prime contractor may become liable for unpaid wages and fringe bene-
fits of employees performing work under the contract, exclusive of
liquidated damages.10 However, employees usually must exhaust all
of their Wage Act remedies against their employer before claiming
wages from a prime contractor." Moreover, an employer is liable to
the prime contractor for any sums paid by the prime contractor to the
employer's employees.
2
Finally, employers and/or employees are prohibited from avoiding
or altering the terms of the Wage Act by contracts, agreements, per-
sonnel policies, or any other method. Any agreements between employ-
ers and employees in contravention of or setting aside the requirements
of the Wage Act are null and void. 3
ployer," but does not always limit these terms to those entities doing business in this state.
Nonetheless, the term "doing business in this state" means having employees actively en-
gaged in the intended principal activity of the person, firm or corporation in West Virginia.
W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(n) (1989). Although the selective use of this term indicates that the
Act's applicability may not be limited to West Virginia employers, this issue has never
been addressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
7. See generally W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1(a), (b), (m), -3 to -5, -6, -8 to -12 (1989).
8. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-7 (1989).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. However, if the prime contractor has failed to notify the State Commissioner of
Labor of the operative contract or subcontract as required by the Wage Act, then the em-
ployees need not exhaust all remedies against their employer. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-7, -16
(1989).
12. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-7 (1989).
13. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-10 (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-12.1 (1990).
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B. Compensation of Current Employees
As set forth below, the Wage Act regulates compensation of cur-
rent employees with specifications regarding time and method of pay-
ment of wages, limitations on the validity of assignment of wages by
employees, and prohibitions of certain employer practices.
1. Time and Method of Payment of Wages
With the exception of railroad companies, most employers must
pay their employees wages due, 14 less authorized deductions and au-
thorized wage assignments, at least once every two weeks. 15 For pur-
poses of this provision of the Wage Act, the term "wages" means
compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether
the amount is determined on a time, task, price, commission, or other
basis of calculation.1
6
Payment of employees' wages must be made by one of the fol-
lowing methods: (1) lawful money of the United States; (2) cash order,
which may include checks or money orders on banks convenient to the
place of employment where suitable arrangements have been made for
the cashing of such check by employees for the full amount of wages;
or (3) any method of depositing immediately available funds in an
employee's demand or time account in a bank, credit union, or savings
and loan institution that may be agreed upon in writing between the
employee and the employer. 7 In addition, if an employee is absent
from work and does not receive his wages through a designated repre-
sentative, he is entitled to be paid at any time thereafter upon demand
14. '"Wages due" includes at least all wages earned up to and including the fifth day
immediately preceding the regular payday. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(i) (1989).
15. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989). However, an employer may, due to peculiar con-
ditions under which it must operate and upon a compelling showing, seek authority from
the commissioner to establish regular payday less frequently than every two weeks. 42 W.
VA. C.S.R. §§ 5-10.1 to -10.4 (1990).
16. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(c) (1989).
17. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989). Such agreement must specifically identify the
employee, the financial institution, the type of account and the account number. Id.
1994]
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upon the proper paymaster at the place where such wages are usually
paid and where the next pay is due.'
Railroad companies 9 must pay their employees on or before the
first day of each month for wages earned during the first half of the
preceding month (ending on the fifteenth).2" Wages earned during the
last half of a calendar month must be paid on or before the fifteenth
day of the following month.2 ' In addition, railroad companies are per-
mitted to pay wages by mail, so long as the payment is mailed in time
to reach the post office of the employee by the applicable first or fif-
teenth day of the month.22
2. Assignment of Wages by Employees
The Wage Act specifically preserves the common law right of
employees to assign their right to payment of wages.21 Wage assign-
ments generally authorize an employer to pay some portion of an
employee's wages to a third party or to withhold some portion of the
wages. In order to be valid, wage assignments must be made in accor-
dance with the 'Wage Act.24
In contrast, deductions from employee wages are not subject to
any procedural requirements. Deductions include amounts required by
law to be withheld, and amounts authorized for union or club dues,
pension plans, payroll savings plans, credit unions, charities, and hospi-
talization and medical insurance.2 Therefore, any amount to be with-
held from an employee's wages that is not a deduction must be autho-
rized by a valid assignment.
The statutory requirements for wage assignments 26 are often over-
18. Id.
19. The term "railroad company" includes any firm or corporation engaged primarily
in the business of tnsportation by rail. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(e) (1989).
20. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-2 (1989).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989).
24. Id.
25. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1(g) to -3 (1989).
26. All provision establishing technical requirements for assignments also apply to
[Vol. 96:743
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looked, but compliance is essential for the validity of such an assign-
ment.2 7 Wage assignments must be in writing and acknowledged be-
fore a notary public, and the employer's written acceptance of the
assignment must be endorsed on the face of the assignment.21 In ad-
dition, the assignment must specify the total amount due and collect-
ible by virtue of the assignment, and must specifically state the re-
quirement that three-fourths of the periodical earnings or wages of the
assignor is at all times exempt from such assignment.2 9 However, no
wage assignment is valid for a period exceeding one year from the
date of such assignment3 To assist with the creation of assignments,
a wage assignment form has been promulgated by the division of labor
and is set forth in the applicable legislative rules.3'
3. Prohibitions on Employer Compensation Practices
In addition to governing compensation to and assignments by
employees, the Wage Act prohibits certain practices relating to alterna-
tive employee compensation. For example, employers are prohibited
from requiring their employees to purchase goods or supplies in lieu of
payment of wages. 32 Violating this provision of the Act is a misde-
meanor.
33
Moreover, if an employer sells goods and supplies in lieu of pay-
ment of wages at prices higher than the reasonable market value, the
employer is civilly liable to such employees for double the amount in
excess of the reasonable value of the charges made for such goods or
supplies.34
"orders for future wages." W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989).
27. See infra part II.B.2.
28. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-11.2 (1990).
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C. Compensation after Resignation, Termination, Layoff or Labor
Dispute
The Wage Act specifies time limits for compensation when em-
ployees resign or cease employment because of termination, layoff, or
a labor dispute. When an employer discharges an employee, the em-
ployer must pay the employee's wages in full within seventy-twohours.35 On the other hand, if an employee resigns, the employer
must pay the employee's wages no later than the next regular payday,
either through the regular pay channels or by mail. 6 However, if a
resigning employee provides at least one pay period's notice of his
intention to quit, then the employer must pay all wages earning by the
employee at the time of resignation.37
If the work of any employee is suspended as a result of a labor
dispute, or when an employee for any reason whatsoever is laid off,
the employer must pay in full all wages earned at the time of suspen-
sion or layoff no later than the next regular payday, either through
regular pay channels or by mail.38 In addition, if requested by the
employee at least twenty-four hours before the last hour of employ-
ment, all accrued benefits must accompany the payment of wages.39
For purposes of the Wage Act provision realating to compensation
upon resignation, termination, layoff, or labor dispute, the term "wag-
es" has a more expansive meaning than as used in the provision relat-
ing to current employee compensation. In that section, the term "wag-
es" includes not only compensation for labor or services, but also
accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to
an employee.40 "Fringe benefits" means any benefit provided to em-
ployees or which are required by law, including regular vacation, grad-
uated vacation, floating vacation, holidays, sick leave, personal leave,
35. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(b) (1989).
36. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(c) (1989).
37. Id.
38. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(d) (1989).
39. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-13.4 (1990).
40. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(c) (1989).
[Vol. 96:743
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production incentive bonuses, sickness and accident benefits, and bene-
fits relating to medical and pension coverage.41
D. Bonding Requirements
In 1981, the West Virginia legislature amended the Wage Act to
include requirements that certain employers post a bond with the Com-
missioner42 for employee wages and fringe benefits.43 The bonding
requirement applies to every employer engaged in or about to engage
in construction work, or the severance, production, or transportation
(excluding railroads and water transporters) of minerals.44 However,
those entities with a history of doing business in the state, meaning
that the entity has been actively and actually engaged in such work for
at least five consecutive years preceding the posting of the bond, are
excluded from the bonding requirement.45
The required bond for wages and benefits must be either a surety
bond, collateral bond, escrow bond, or letter of credit, as those terms
are defined in the governing legislative rules.46 The condition of the
41. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(1) (1989).
42. The term "Commissioner" refers to the State Commissioner of Labor of his
designee, who is charged with the enforcement and administration of the Wage Act. W. VA.
CODE § 21-5-1(d), -11(a) (1989). The Commissioner is also charged with the control and
management of the State Division of Labor.
43. 1981 W. Va. Acts 212. See W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-14 to -15 (1989 & Supp.
1993).
44. The term "minerals" means clay, coal, flagstone, gravel, limestone, manganese,
sand, sandstone, shale, iron ore and any other metallurgical ore. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(k)
(1989).
45. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14 (Supp. 1993).
46. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-2.5 (1990). The legislative rules define "bond" as a legal
instrument binding the maker to pay a legal obligation for money. Id. A "surety bond"
means a bond whereby a third party insures or guarantees that the wages of an employer
shall be paid to employees when such wages are due, and that if such employer fails or
defaults in the payments of such wages when they are, then the insuring party will pay
such wages when due and shall seek redress from the defaulting employer. 42 W. VA.
C.S.R. § 5-2.5(a) (1990). A "collateral bond" means the pledge and/or deposit of cash,
certificates of deposit or other such certificates or securities owned by an employer, upon
approval by the commissioner and the State Treasurer. The collateral of personal property
may also include cash or collateral securities or certificates as follows: bonds of the United
States or its possessions, or of the federal land bank or the homeowner's loan corporation;
1994]
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bond must be that the employer pay the wages and fringe benefits of
its employees when due. The amount of the bond must be the total of
the employer's gross payroll for four weeks at full capacity or produc-
tion, plus fifteen percent of that total.47
According to the Wage Act, the Commissioner "shall waive the
posting of any bond upon his determination that an employer is of
sufficient financial responsibility to pay wages and fringe benefits."48
Although this waiver provision appears to be mandatory, legislative
rules state that "[i]n no event will the Commissioner be compelled to
issue a waiver., 49 The Commissioner may also waive the bonding
requirements for the wages and fringe benefits of owners, partners or
corporate officers.50
full faith and credit general obligation bonds of the State of West Virginia or other states,
and of any county, district or municipality of the State of West Virginia or other states; or
certificates of deposit in a bank in this state, which certificates must be in the favor of the
state. Upon the pledge and deposit of collateral bonding, the employer shall execute a
promissory *document whereby if the employer fails or defaults in the payment of wages
due to his employees, that the State treasurer has the authority to convert as much of the
collateral assets to cash in order to pay the wages that are due and owing in accordance
with W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(e) (Supp. 1993). W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(c) (Supp. 1993); 42
W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-2.5(b) (1990). An "escrow bond" means money deposited with the State
Treasurer in trust, placed in an account in the name of the Division of Labor and the em-
ployer. An employer who cannot provide either a surety bond or collateral bond must de-
posit with the Division of Labor the amount of money set forth in W. VA. CODE § 21-5-
14(a) (Supp. 1993). 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-2.5(d) (1990). Finally, a "letter of credit" means
a signed agreement by a third party reputable and solvent banking or other financial insti-
tution evidencing a line of credit sufficient to cover amounts required and established by the
Division of Labor to serve as a bond guarantee and to be paid to the Division of Labor as
provided in W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14 (Supp. 1993). All letters of credit must clearly state
that the credit is irrevocable. The commissioner must determine that all letters of credit
accepted are valid, stable instruments of credit that will guarantee and secure payment of
wages and fringe benefits in the even of a wage and fringe benefit default by an employer.
42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-2.5(d) (1990).
47. The amount of such bond may increase or decrease as the employer's payroll
increases or decreases, however, the amount of the bond may not be decreased absent ap-
proval by the Commissioner and a determination that there are no outstanding claims against
the bond. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14 (Supp. 1993).
48. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(b) (Supp. 1993). The legislative rules specify certain
financial documentation necessary to receive a waiver and provide that waivers are granted
for a period of six months. 42 W. VA. C.S.R § 5-16.4(a), (c) (1990).
49. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-16.4(a) (1990).
50. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-16.4(b) (1990).
[Vol. 96:743
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A Wage Act bond may be terminated, with the approval of the
Commissioner, after the employer submits a verified statement to the
Commissioner that one of the following has occurred: (1) the employer
has ceased doing business and all wages and fringe benefits have been
paid; or (2) the employer has been doing business in the state for at
least five consecutive years and has paid all wages and fringe bene-
fits.,,
The Wage Act's bond provisions also incorporate criminal penal-
ties. For example, any employer who fails to provide and maintain an
adequate bond is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine of not
less than $250 nor more than $5,000, and/or imprisonment for not
more than one month. 2 In addition, any entity that disposes of or
relocates assets with the intent to deprive employees of their wages
and fringe benefits is guilty of a felony and subject to a fine of not
less than $5,000 nor more than $30,000, and/or imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than three years.53 Finally, any person who
threatens any officer, agent, or employee of the Division of Labor or
other person authorized to assist the Commissioner in performing his
duties under the bond provisions, or interferes with the performance of
such duties, is guilty of a felony and subject to a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $3,000 and/or imprisonment for not less than
one nor more than three years.54
E. Notification and Recordkeeping Requirements
The Wage Act creates a number of notification and recordkeeping
requirements relating to payment of wages, bonding requirements, and
contracting. With regard to payment of wages, every employer must
perform the following administrative functions:
(1) Notify his employees in writing, at the time of hiring of the
rate of pay, and of the day, hour, and place of payment.55
51. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(g) (Supp. 1993); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-16.6 (1990).
52. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15(a) (1989).
53. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15(b) (1989).
54. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15(d) (1989).
55. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(1) (1989).
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(2) Notify his employees in writing or through a posted notice of
any changes in the arrangements specified in (1) at least one full pay
period prior to the time of such changes. 56
(3) Notify employees in writing or through a posted notice of em-
ployment practices and policies with regard to vacation pay, sick leave,
"and comparable matters. 57
(4) Furnish each employee with an itemized statement of deduc-
tions made from his wages for each pay period such deductions are
made.58
(5) Keep posted in a place accessible to his employees an abstract
of the Wage Act article furnished by the Commissioner.59
(6) Maintain payroll and employment records.60
With regard to employers to which the statutory requirements
regarding bonding apply, the Wage Act specifies that such employers
must post the following items in a place accessible to their employees:
56. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(2) (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-14.1 (1990).
57. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(3) (1989).
58. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(4) (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-14.3 (1990).
59. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(5) (1989). This abstract is set forth at 42 W. VA. C.S.R.
§ 5-14.3 (1990).
60. Such records with respect to each and every employee must contain full name,
identifying symbol or number if such is used in place of name, social security number,
home address, date of birth if under eighteen, occupation or job classification, rate of regu-
lar pay and rate of overtime pay, hours worked each workday and total hours worked each
workweek, and method of calculating the percent of fringe benefits owed to an employee at
any given time. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-4.1 (1990). In addition, the records must be kept
safe and accessible either at the place of employment or at one or more established central
recordkeeping offices where such records are customarily maintained. All records of the
employer shall be open to the division of labor for inspection and reproduction to insure
compliance with the Act. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-9(5) (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-4, -7
(1990). Records maintained in a central recordkeeping location must be made available
within seventy-two hours of written notice from the Commissioner. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-
7.1 (1990). However, an employer, due to peculiar conditions under which it must operate,
may petition for authority to maintain records in a manner other than as required by the
statute and legislative rule. Id.
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(1) A copy of the bond or other evidence of surety specifying the
number of employees covered, or notification that the posting of a
bond has been waived by the Commissioner.1
(2) A copy of the notice prescribed by the Commissioner regard-
ing the duties of employers under this section.62
In addition, during the first two years that an employer is doing
business in the state in construction or mining work, the employer
must file verified quarterly reports of the number of employees with
the Division of Labor, or a copy of the quarterly report filed with the
bureau of employment programs showing the accurate number of em-
ployees.63 The Commissioner may waive this reporting requirement if
the employer "is of sufficient stability that the reporting is unneces-
sary. 64
Finally, specific notice requirements apply to any person, firm, or
corporation that contracts or subcontracts with an employer where such
contract or subcontract contemplates either construction work or the
severance, production, or transportation of minerals, or any combina-
tion of such activities.65 Within ten days following the execution of
such a contract or subcontract, the prime contractor must notify the
Commissioner, by certified mail, of the contract or subcontract.66
Such notification is not necessary if the prime contractor determines
that the Commissioner has already obtained such information from
another state agency.67 However, a prime contractor's failure to give
61. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(f)(1) (Supp. 1993).
62. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(f)(2) (Supp. 1993). Although the statute contemplates a
notice, the Division of Labor has not prescribed the form of such a notice.
63. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-14(f)(2) (Supp. 1993). This report must be filed on or be-
fore the first day of February, May, August, and November of each calendar year. Id.
64. Id.
65. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-16 (1989). Railroads and water transporters are excluded
from this provision. Id.
66. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-16 (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-16.7 (1990). Such notifi-
cation must include the employer's name, the location of the job site, and the employer's
principal business location. Id. The prime contractor must also continue to identify specific
contracts and subcontracts at each jobsite on behalf of the principal contract. 42 W. VA.
C.S.R. § 5-16.7 (1990).
67. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-16 (1989).
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proper notice is a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not less that $500
and not more than $5,000.68
F. Enforcement and Remedies
The enforcement scheme created by the Wage Act is a combina-
tion of administrative and private remedies. Generally, the Commis-
sioner is empowered to enforce the entire Wage Act and employees
have certain private causes of action to recover damages.
1. Administrative Enforcement
As noted above, the Wage Act charges the Commissioner with the
administration and enforcement of the Wage Act.69 Accordingly, the
Commissioner *has broad investigative powers,70 as well as the power
to examine witnesses under oath, issue subpoenas, compel the atten-
dance of witnesses and the production of documents, and to take depo-
sitions and affidavits in any proceeding before the Commissioner.1 In
addition, the Commissioner may bring a legal action to collect a claim
under the Wage Act on behalf of an employee.72
The Commissioner must issue a cease and desist order at any time
that it is determined that an employer has not provided or maintained
an adequate bond as required by the Wage Act.73 Such an order must
provide that the offending employer either post an adequate bond or
68. Id.
69. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-11 to -15 (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. §§ 5-3.1 to -15.1
(1990).
70. The applicable legislative rules contemplate periodic inspections to ensure compli-
ance with all provisions of the Act. 42 W. VA. C.S.R. §§ 5-3.1(d) to -3.2 (1990).
71. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-11 (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. § 5-3.1 (1990). The Commis-
sioner may enforce subpoenas and has authority to compel testimony and production of
documents in the circuit court. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-11(c) (1989).
72. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(a) (1989); 42 W. VA. C.S.R. §§ 5-3.1 to -15.1 (1990).
In legal actions brought by the commissioner, the commissioner is relieved from any filing
fees or any other costs or fees of any nature in connection with such action, and need not
file bond or' other security of any nature. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(b) (1989). In addition,
attorneys' fees may be assessed against the defendant in such actions. Id.
73. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15(c) (1989).
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cease further operations in the state within a period of not less than
five nor more than fourteen days.74 Any employer that continues to
engage in construction or mining work without an approved bond after
such period is guilty of a felony and subject to a fine of not less than
$5,000 or more than $30,000, and/or imprisonment for not less than
one or more than three years.75
2. Employees' Remedies
Two Wage Act provisions govern the remedies available to em-
ployees who are not paid wages due in a timely fashion as required by
the Wage Act. As discussed below, different remedies are available to
current employees than those available to former employees. 76 Em-
ployees may pursue either of these remedies by bringing "any legal
action necessary to collect a claim under this article.
77
First, current employees are entitled to recover wages due, plus
legal interest, if not compensated at the intervals of time required by
the Wage Act.78 This provision applies not only to wages but also to
payment of fringe benefits when due and to timely redemption of cash
orders.79
On the other hand, employees who resign or cease employment
because of termination, layoff, or labor dispute are entitled to recover
not only wages due (including fringe benefits) but also liquidated
damages. 80  Liquidated damages are calculated by multiplying the
74. Id.
75. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-15(c) (1989). An employer against whom such a cease and
desist order is issued may seek judicial review of the order by filing a verified petition
taking an appeal within fifteen days from the service of the order. Such a petition may be
filed in the circuit court of the county where service of the order was completed or in the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County. In order to be perfected, an appeal must be accompanied
by the filing with the circuit court of a bond or other security in the amount of not less
than the amount of the bond otherwise required to be posted under the Act. Unless the
appeal is perfected within the fifteen-day period, the cease and desist order is final. Id.
76. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-3, -4, -6 (1989).
77. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(a) (1989).
78. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-6 (1989).
79. Id.
80. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (1989).
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number of days the employer is in default, up to a maximum of thirty,
by the amount of wages at the employee's regular rate. In other
words, if an employee who earned $34 a day was owed $300 in wag-
es upon his resignation, and his employer did not pay him the $300
until ten days after the regular payday following the resignation, then
the employee could recover ten times the daily wage rate, or $340, in
liquidated damages.
The Wage Act states that employees have the same lien and other
rights and remedies for the protection and enforcement of liquidated
damages as they would have been entitled had they rendered services
for the liquidated damages.81 Furthermore, for purposes of liquidated
damages, failure to pay wages is not deemed to continue after the date
of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy with respect to the employer
"if he is adjudicated bankrupt upon such petition. ' 82
In addition to the remedies set forth above, employees are entitled
to recover attorneys' fees.83 As a result, Wage Act claims are attrac-
tive to some attorneys representing employees, particularly when a
large group of employees has not been properly paid upon termination.
However, these generous remedies are not the only incentive for bring-
ing Wage Act claims. As discussed in the following section, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also enhanced the Act's reme-
dial provisions in order to prevent employees from being unduly limit-
ed by the plain meaning of the Wage Act.
III. COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAGE PAYMENT
AND COLLECTION ACT
The predecessor provisions to the modem Wage Act were enacted
in the late nineteenth century, but amendments since 1975 have created
most of the Wage Act's current provisions.84 Thus, the Wage Act in
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(b) (1989).
84. Early versions of the Wage Act were enacted in 1887 W. Va. Acts c. 63, 1891
W. Va. Acts c. 63, and 1917 W. Va. Acts c. 50. In 1975 and 1979, the main provisions
were amended and new remedies provisions added. 1979 W. Va. Laws c. 119; 1975 W.
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its present form is less than twenty years old. Moreover, prior to the
1981 decision in Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp.,85 very few reported
court decisions interpreted the Wage Act. Since 1981, however, the
Wage Act has become a common element in labor and employment
cases as a result of the generous interpretation given to many of its
provisions by the courts.
Courts have focused on the following four main issues relating to
the Wage Act: (1) enforcement and remedies; (2) personal liability of
corporate officers; (3) wage assignments; and (4) relationship between
the Wage Act and federal statutes. This section will analyze the man-
ner in which courts have construed the Wage Act by discussing the
cases in the context of these four issues.
A. Enforcement and Remedies
1. New Rights under Farley v. Zapata Coal Corporation
The enforcement and remedies provisions of the Act underwent a
substantial transformation in the decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Farley v. Zapata Coal Corp.86 As a result, the
Wage Act is not merely an employment statute but is also an impos-
ing threat of liability to companies acting as employers or conducting
business transactions with employers, particularly in the coal industry.
In order to enhance the ability of employees to recover unpaid or
improperly paid wages, the Farley court disregarded statutory language
in a manner that still affects the approach taken to the Wage Act by
courts and counsel.
The plaintiffs in the Farley case were employees of M & T Coal
Corporation (M & T), which operated a mine as a general contractor
Va. Laws c. 147. Finally, the bonding requirements were added in 1981. 1981 W. Va.
Laws c. 212. Minor revisions have been made since that time. 1991 W. Va. Acts c. 16;
1989 W. Va. Acts c. 107; 1989 W. Va. Acts c. 73; 1987 W. Va. Acts c. 73; 1984 W. Va.
Acts c. 113.
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for Zapata Coal Corporation (Zapata), the lessee of the coal rights.87
When M & T ceased operations, it failed to pay wages and compensa-
tion for accrued vacation and sick pay to the plaintiffs. The Farley
plaintiffs filed mechanics' liens8 8 against both M & T and Zapata,
claiming entitlement to actual wages, accrued vacation and sick pay,
and liquidated damages under the Act.89 Although this action was
brought to enforce the mechanics' liens, the plaintiffs also sought to
recover attorneys' fees pursuant to the Wage Act.
The circuit court held that the plaintiffs could not enforce their
mechanics' liens for accrued vacation pay or sick pay or liquidated
damages against Zapata,90 and that they were not entitled to an award
of attorneys' fees.91 However, Justice McGraw, for the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, reversed these holdings in an opinion that
changed the face of both the Wage Act and the mechanics' lien stat-
ute. As Justice Miller commented in his dissenting opinion in Farley:
The Legislature may be slightly astounded by the way in which the major-
ity has legislated new meaning into W. VA. CODE § 25-5-1, et seq. De-
spite the plain language of this statute confining its ambit to the employer-
employee relationship, the majority has now opened it so wide that anyone
may be sued if he has any connection with the wage earner's employer.
92
The Farley court's reasoning revolved around three basic issues:
(1) whether a lien for accrued sick or vacation pay can be enforced
under the mechanics' lien statute; (2) whether the plaintiffs' claim for
liquidated damages could be enforced against Zapata; and (3) whether
87. Id.
88. Chapter 38, Article 2 of the West Virginia Code provides for numerous different
types of liens that are generally referred to as mechanics' liens. W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to
-39 (1985 & Supp. 1993). However, the discussion of such liens in this article shall be
limited td the lien created for "perfecting lien for work or labor against corporation." W.
VA. CODE § 31-2-31. Thus, subsequent references to the "mechanics' lien statute" shall
specifically refer to W. VA. CODE § 31-2-31.
89. 281 S.E.2d 238.
90. Zapata had conceded that the plaintiffs were entitled to enforce their liens for the
four weeks of regular wages due at the time M & T ceased operations pursuant to W. VA.
CODE § 38-2-31, and the circuit court ruled accordingly. Id. at 241.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 246 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs were entitled to recover attorneys' fees pursuant to the Act.
Underlying the court's conclusions regarding all three of these issues,
however, is its holding that the Wage Act and the mechanics' lien
statute both relate to employee liens to secure compensation and there-
fore should be read in pari materia.93 As Justice Miller explained in
the dissenting opinion, the serious flaw in this reasoning is that the
two statutes relate to distinctly different subjects.94 As a result, the
entire majority opinion is nothing more than an exercise in judicial
legislation.
First, the Farley court considered the issue of whether a lien for
accrued sick leave or vacation pay can be enforced under the
mechanics' lien statute to be governed by the definition of wages set
forth in other statutes and regulations. In other words, the court ob-
served that fringe benefits are deemed wages under both the Wage
Act, the unemployment compensation laws, and the federal bankruptcy
law, and thus concluded that all fringe benefits must necessarily be
considered part of the "value of such work or labor" to be paid under
the mechanics' lien statute.95
Second, the court transplanted the liquidated damages penalty from
the Wage Act to the mechanics' lien statute. Although the liquidated
damages provision of the Wage Act is strictly limited to the employer-
employee relationship, the majority invented the following legal fiction
applicable to liquidated damages:
The effect of W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) is to create by law a fictitious
additional thirty days of employment, and to grant the employee the same
remedies and procedures for enforcing his lien for compensation for that
fictitious thirty days that he would have had for the value of the work per-
formed.96
Thus, the majority ignored the penalty aspect of the liquidated damag-
es provision and concluded that such damages are merely additional
93. Id. at 243.
94. Id. at 245 (Miller, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 241-42. It should be noted that Justice Miller concurred with this portion of
the majority's holding. Id. at 244-45 (Miller, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 242-43.
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wages. Moreover, as Justice Miller observed, the majority imposed a
penalty meant to induce employers to pay wages on third-party entities
that have no control over the employer's actions.
97
In addition, the majority fuses the Wage Act and the mechanics'
lien statute by concluding that the latter "is properly used in aid of the
enforcement of a lien for liquidated damages granted under" the Wage
Act.98 Incredibly, the enforcement procedures set forth in the Wage
Act were deemed by the Farley court to include the mechanics' lien
statute without any action by the legislature.
Finally, the majority transformed the Farley plaintiffs' cause of
action from one pursuant to the mechanics' lien statute to one pursuant
to the Wage Act in order to award attorneys' fees.99 The Farley court
determined that plaintiffs, who were enforcing mechanics' liens, were
entitled to recover attorneys' fees under the Wage Act despite the
Wage Act's specific language that such fees may be recovered in "any
action brought under this article."' 1
In addition to the specific judicial legislation promulgated by way
of the Farley decision, the legacy of the case has been to promote a
theme that the Wage Act's terms may be disregarded when necessary
and with impunity to justify the desired goal. As expressed by Justice
McGraw in a portion of the Farley case that is commonly cited, that
goal is simply stated: "[b]oth the Wage Payment and Collection Act
and our mechanics' lien statutes are designed to protect the laborer and
act as an aid in the collection of compensation wrongfully with-
held."' ' While the goal of assuring just compensation for employees
has considerable merit, the means to reach that goal that are promoted
by the Farley case are to disregard statutory provisions when neces-
sary. While no subsequent cases decided under the Wage Act have
duplicated Farley's radical departure from statutory language, that
case's liberal interpretation theme still pervades the Act.
97. Id. at 245-46.
98. Id. at 243.
99. Id. at 246 (Miller, J., dissenting).
100. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-12(b) (1989) (emphasis added); Farley, 281 S.E.2d at 243-
44.
101. Farley, 281 S.E.2d at 244.
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Recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined an
opportunity to modify the Farley holding in Amick v. C & T Develop-
ment Co.1"2 In a similar case to Farley, the Amick court, per curiam,
reaffirmed both the judicially-created interrelationship between the
Wage Act and the mechanics' lien statute and the susceptibility of
third parties to the liability created for employees under the Wage Act.
The Amick plaintiffs were employees of C & T Development
Company (C & T), which had entered into a contract with Elk River
Sewell Coal Company (Elk River Sewell) to mine coal on property
owned by Elk River Sewell.10 3 After C & T failed to pay its em-
ployees, the plaintiffs filed mechanics' liens and pursued a civil action
against both C & T and Elk River Sewell.
Affirming the decision of the circuit court, the Amick opinion
mirrors Farley. Based on Farley, the Amick court held that plaintiffs
could recover liquidated damages and that they were entitled to recov-
er attorneys' fees under the Wage Act1°4 However, the Amick court
also interpreted a portion of the liquidated damages provisions on
which the court had not yet commented.
As noted above, 105 the Act states that for purposes of liquidated
damages, failures to pay wages shall not be deemed to continue after
the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy with respect to the
employer if he is adjudicated bankrupt upon such petition.'0 6 In
Amick, Elk River Sewell contended that the bankruptcy petition of C
& T mitigated liquidated damages against Elk River Sewell pursuant to
this provision. However, the Amick court concluded that the "plain
meaning" of the statute is that this limitation is to be applied only to
102. 416 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1992).
103. Id. at 74-75. The Amick court also noted that pursuant to the contract, Elk River
Sewell retained the right to designate the areas to be mined as well as the tonnages to be
supplied, and retained the right to specify the mining plans. Id. However, the court did not
rely on these facts in its decision.
104. Id. at 75-76.
105. See supra part III.A.1.
106. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (1989).
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the employer, thus obligating Elk River Sewell for the post-filing liqui-
dated damages brought about by C & T. °7
The problem with this new enhancement of the Farley rights is
that the Amick court ignored the fact that the cause of action against
the third party is derivative of the cause of action against the employ-
er.10' In other words, under Farley, the Wage Act creates the sub-
stance of the employees' "lien," and the mechanics' lien is merely an
aid to enforcement.'0 9 The Amick court's conclusion that the bank-
ruptcy limitation does not apply when the "lien" is enforced against
third parties is not only an extension of the statutes but also beyond
the Farley doctrine itself. As a result, if an employer files a bankrupt-
cy petition only two days after failing to pay employee wages, then
the employer is only liable for two days of liquidated damages. How-
ever, an entity related to the employer such that the mechanics' lien
statute applies could be liable, under Farley and Amick, for a full
thirty days of liquidated damages if the employees remain unpaid.
Non-employer coal companies like Elk River Sewell and Zapata have
been rendered virtually helpless to avoid this result.
2. Statute of Limitations
Although employees pursuing a Parley cause of action must con-
form to the ninety-day statute of limitations for a mechanics' lien, 10
employees pursuing causes of action pursuant to the actual terms of
the Wage Act need only meet a five-year statute of limitations, regard-
less of the provision of the Wage Act on which the cause of action is
based."' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that
107. Amick, 416 S.E.2d at 77.
108. Farley, 281 S.E.2d at 242-43 (recognizing that the ability to pursue a claim
against a third-party contractor for liquidated damages that should have been paid by the
employer is the same as pursuing a claim for wages that should have been paid by the
employer).
109. Id.
110. See Amick, 416 S.E.2d at 77 (holding that an employee that did not file a
mechanics' lien in conformity with the ninety-day requirements set forth in W. VA. CODE §
38-2-32 could not recover liquidated damages against Elk River Sewell).
111. Goodwin v. Willard, 406 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1991) (rejecting argument that one-
year statute of limitations for civil penalty applied to cause of action under invalid assign-
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the Wage Act creates a contract with employees for proper payment of
wages, therefore, the five-year statute of limitations applicable to ac-
tions on contracts is appropriate."12 The Supreme Court of Appeals
has never addressed the inherent contradiction between this view and
the doctrine of employment at-will, which as of this writing is still
viable law in West Virginia."3
3. Computation of Liquidated Damages
One somewhat bright spot for employers in the cases interpreting
the Wage Act is Cooper v. Glavas Contracting Co.,1t4 which places
a reasonable limitation on the computation of liquidated damages. In
Cooper, the employer had withheld union dues from its employees
wages in an amount dictated by the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. However, the employer never sent these dues to the un-
ion. u5
The Cooper plaintiffs brought an action pursuant to the Wage Act
to recover the wrongfully withheld dues as well as liquidated damages
and attorneys' fees." 6 The plaintiffs contended that liquidated damag-
es were to be calculated by multiplying their daily wage rate by the
ment); Jones v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988) (rejecting argu-
ment that two-year tort statute of limitations applied to cause of action under invalid assign-
ments); Lucas v. Moore, 303 S.E.2d 739 (W. Va. 1983) (rejecting argument that one-year
statute of limitations for civil penalty applied to cause of action for liquidated damages);
Western v. Buffalo Mining Co., 251 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that cause of ac-
tion based on invalid assignment was subject to five-year statute of limitations).
112. See supra note 111.
113. See generally Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker Machinery Co., 431 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va.
1993); Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986); Harless v. First National Bank
in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
114. 354 S.E.2d 822 (V. Va. 1987).
115. Id. at 823.
116. Id. The one confusing aspect of this case is the court's failure to explain whether
the employees were current or former employees of the employer. As explained above,
liquidated damages are available only when an employer fails to compensate employees
timely upon termination, resignation, layoff or in the event of a labor dispute. W. VA.
CODE § 21-5-4 (1989). However, if the employer merely violated the Act's provision relat-
ing to payment of present employees in a timely manner, the employer should have pre-
vailed on an argument that liquidated damages are not available to compensate violations of
that portion of the Act. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989).
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thirty days. However, Justice Brotherton writing for the Cooper court
upheld the decision of the circuit court, which had awarded the daily
rate of union dues withheld by thirty days. The court explained its
holding as follows: "The employees' reading of the statute is untena-
ble. Were we to adopt it, it would prescribe the same punishment for
an employer who negligently left a penny off each of his employees'
paychecks and an employer who failed to pay his employees at
ai',
1 17
The Cooper court's holding recognizes that the Wage Act provides
that if an employee is not paid "wages," the employer is liable for an
extra thirty days of "wages" at the regular rate. In Cooper, the court
acknowledged that the broad definition of wages included union dues.
But because the unpaid "wages" were the union dues, the appropriate
multiplier to calculate liquidated damages for which the employer was
liable under the statute was the union dues withholding rate, not the
full wage rate. 1 8 As noted above, this holding recognizes that under
the Wage Act, liquidated damages bear some proportional relationship
to the unpaid wages.
B. Personal Liability of Corporate Officers
Following in the footsteps of the Farley decision, the supreme
court of appeals took a second major step in promoting an expansive
interpretation of the Act in Mullins v. Venable." 9 Justice McGraw,
writing once again for the court, seized this opportunity to conclude
that an officer in the management of a corporation who knowingly
permits the corporation to violate the provision of the Wage Act may
be held personally liable for unpaid wages, fringe benefits, and liqui-
dated damages.'
The plaintiffs in the Mullins case were former employees of a
corporation operating an underground coal mine.' These plaintiffs
117. Cooper, 354 S.E.2d at 824.
118. Id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (1989).
119. 297 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1982).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 868.
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brought an action against Venable, the president of the employer-cor-
poration, to recover wages and fringe benefits that remained unpaid
after the corporation ceased operations. 2 The circuit court granted
summary judgment in favor of Venable on the basis that the Wage
Act does not impose personal liability on corporate officers.
Venable contended, and the Mullins court acknowledged, that the
Wage Act does not explicitly impose liability on corporate officers.
However, the court concluded that the West Virginia legislature "in-
tended to impose liability on officers . .. who knowingly permit their
corporation to act in violation of the provisions of the Act."' 23 The
Mullins court relied on the Wage Act's definition of "officer," which
includes "officers and agents in the management of a corporation or
firm, who knowingly permit the corporation or firm to violate [the
Act]."'124 The court determined that because the term "officer" is also
included in the Wage Act's definition of "firm," and because the term
"firm" is used throughout the Wage Act to designate a liable party,
then personal liability for damages under the Wage Act is necessarily
extended to corporate officers.2 5
Adding to the holding in the case, the Mullins court observed that
the Wage Act, in effect, "creates quasi-public officials who owe a duty
to the public, as well as the corporation's employees, to take care that
[the Act] is enforced."'2 6 However, the court did not comment on the
obvious contradiction between this "quasi-public officials" notion and
the duty of loyalty and other fiduciary duties imposed by law on cor-
porate officers and directors. Moreover, the court rejected the argu-
ments that the employees should be required to exhaust their remedies
against either the corporate employer or a third-party "prime contrac-
tor" prior to bringing an action against a corporate officer. 2 7
122. Id. at 866-67.
123. Id. at 869.
124. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(h) (1989).
125. Id. The Act defines "firm" as including "any partnership, association, joint-stock
company, trust, division of a corporation, the administrator or executor or estate of a de-
ceased individual, or the receiver, trustee, or successor of any of the same, or officer there-
of, employing any person." W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(a) (1989).
126. Mullins, 297 S.E.2d at 871.
127. Id at 870-72.
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In a subsequent decision applying the principle of individual liabil-
ity as articulated in the Mullins case, the supreme court of appeals
demonstrated its willingness to extend individual liability not only to
corporate officers but also to individuals in an agency relationship with
the employing entity. In Goodwin v. Willard,12 8 the court reversed
and remanded the decision of the circuit court, which had granted
summary judgment in favor of a shareholder of a coal mining busi-
ness. .The plaintiffs, former employees of the corporation, contended
that the shareholder was liable for wages and fringe benefits. 29
The Goodwin court observed that the Wage Act's definition of
"officer" on which the Mullins court had relied is broadly defined to
include agents. 130 The court remanded the case on the agency issue,
recognizing that "[tlhe question of whether an agency exists is ordi-
narily a question of fact."' 31 The court did not discuss whether any
evidence supported the allegations of a knowing violation. As demon-
strated by Mullins and Goodwin, officers and directors of employing
entities must be aware that the supreme court of appeals does not
hesitate to recognize a potential source of individual liability under the
Wage Act.
C. Wage Assignments
As discussed above, the Wage Act strictly limits employee assign-
ments of wages by imposing formal procedural requirements for the
assignment agreement. 32 State and federal courts have recognized
that while the Wage Act does not create the legal right to assign wag-
es, it does regulate and restrict that right in a manner to which strict
compliance is required.1 33 In other words, an employer wishing to
collect on loans or other obligations of an employee by deducting
128. 406 S.E.2d 752 (W. Va. 1991).
129. Id. at 754.
130. Id. at 757.
131. Id.
132. See supra part II.B.2.
133. See, e.g., Western v. Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Jones v.
Tri-County Growers, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988); Clendenin Lumber and Supply
Co. v. Carpenter, 305 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1983).
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amounts from employees' paychecks must be sure to obtain a valid
assignment, unless such amounts are clearly "deductions" for purposes
of the Wage Act.
134
For example, in Jones v. Tri-County Growers, Inc.,135 a number
of foreign farm workers sued their former employer to recover
amounts that were withheld from their wages. These withholdings were
properly made pursuant to a master contract between the employer, the
workers, and the Jamaican government.1 36 However, the employer
had not received wage assignments executed by the employees in
compliance with the Wage Act. 37
The Jones court held that substantial compliance with the Wage
Act's wage assignment restrictions was not sufficient, and that compli-
ance with all requirements of the Wage Act is mandatory when assign-
ing employee wages.1 38 The court relied on "a deliberate legislative
intent to allow assignment of wages if, and only if, certain specified
conditions are met.' ' 139 This strict interpretation of the assignment
provision is consistent with the approach taken in earlier cases decided
under the Wage Act.14 0
Courts have also taken a restrictive view of the category of per-
missible "deductions" from wages under the Wage Act. While wage
assignments must comply with all of the formal requirements set forth
in the Wage Act, "deductions" from wages may be made without any
such written assignment agreement.' 4 ' As defined by the Wage Act,
"the term deductions includes amounts required by law to be withheld
and amounts authorized for union or club dues, pension plans, payroll
134. See supra part II.B.2.
135. 366 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988).
136. Id. at 728.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 730.
139. Id.
140. See Clendenin Lumber and Supply Co., 305 S.E.2d at 332 (holding that wage
assignment that did not comply with all of the requirements of the Act was invalid); Mills
v. Hollis-Lowman Sales Service, Inc., 101 Lab. Cases 34,566 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Berk. Co.
1984) (assignment that is not acknowledged and that does not state on its face that three-
fourths of periodic wage is exempt from assignment is invalid).
141. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-3 (1989).
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savings plans, credit unions, charities and hospitalization and medical
insurance."' 42
Although the Wage Act's definition of deductions is clearly not an
exhaustive list, the courts have virtually disregarded the use of the
term "includes" in favor of a view that the definition is exclusive. For
example, the supreme court of appeals concluded in Clendenin Lumber
& Supply Co. v'. Carpenter that "deductions are only those "amounts
required by law to be withheld" or those amounts that fit into one of
the specifically enumerated categories of common employment deduc-
tions. 143 The Clendenin Lumber court reached this conclusion by
reading two statutes in conjunction with one another-the wage assign-
ment provision of the Wage Act and the assignment provision of the
West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act.'" In addition to
ignoring the plain meaning of the Wage Act's deduction definition as
set forth above, this reasoning is flawed because the Consumer Credit
and Protection Act provision on which it relies only applies to assign-
ments for the payments of debt arising from one or more consumer
credit sales, consumer loans or sales, as those terms are defined in the
Consumer Credit and Protection Act.145 Moreover, the reference to
142. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(g) (1989).
143. Clendenin Lwnber, 305 S.E.2d at 338.
144. W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-3 (1989), 46A-2-116 (1992); see Clendenin Lumber, 305
S.E.2d at 332.
145. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116 (1992). A "consumer credit sale" is a sale of goods,
services or an interest in land in which: (a) credit is granted either by a seller who regular-
ly engages as a seller in credit transactions of the same kind pursuant to a seller credit
card; (b) the buyer is a person other than an organization; (c) the goods, services or inter-
est in land are purchased primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural purpose;
(d) either the debt is payable in installments or a sales finance charge is made; and (e)
with respect to a sale of goods or services the amount financed does not exceed $25,000.
A "consumer credit sale" does not include a sale in which the seller allows the buyer to
purchase goods or services pursuant to a lender credit card or similar arrangement. W. VA.
CODE § 46A-1-102(13) (1992). A "consumer lease" means a lease of goods: (a) which a
lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing makes to a person, other than an organi-
zation, who takes under the lease primarily for a personal family or household purpose; (b)
in which the amount payable under the lease does not exceed $25,000; and (c) which is for
a term exceeding four months. A "consumer lease" does not include a lease made pursuant
to a lender credit card or similar arrangement. W. VA. CODE § 46A-1-102(14) (1992). Fi-
nally, a "sale" includes any sale, offer 'for sale or attempt to sell any goods for cash or
credit or any services or offer for services for cash or credit. W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102(d)
(Vol. 96:743
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deductions in the Consumer Credit and Protection Act is clearly dif-
ferent than the definition of deductions in the Wage Act.146 Thus,
reading these two provisions together, or, as the court describes, in
pari materia, is not appropriate because of these distinct differences.
Nonetheless, the Clendenin Lumber court disregarded the limitations
imposed by statutory terms in order to restrict deductions under the
Wage Act even more than the statutory meaning provides.
D. Relationship Between the Wage Payment and Collection Act
and Federal Statutes
The Wage Act is only one of numerous state and federal statutes
governing or in some way affecting the payment of wages and benefits
to employees.'47 With regard to applicable federal statutes, questions
of preemption have regularly been addressed by courts interpreting the
Wage Act most often in connection with the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA)148 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA).149
Federal preemption is generally an unattractive option for employ-
ees because the Wage Act's liquidated damages and attorneys' fees
provisions are more generous than the remedial provisions provided by
ERISA and the LMRA. Moreover, actions under ERISA and the
LMRA generally must be pursued in federal court. Without engaging
in a complete discussion of the complicated topic of federal statutory
preemption, this section will briefly discuss the manner in which feder-
(1992).
146. Compare W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(g) (1989) and W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-116(2)(b)
(1992).
147. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988) (regulating
minimum wage and overtime for employees); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (regulating administration of employee benefits, in-
cluding pension and health care plans); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1988) (requiring that certain employers provide eligible employees with un-
paid leave); West Virginia Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Law, W. VA. CODE §§
21-5C-1 to -11 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
149. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
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al preemption issues raised by the LMRA and ERISA have been ad-
dressed by courts interpreting the Wage Act.
1. The Labor Management Relations Act
Section 301 of the LMRA provides that "[s]uits for violations of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties . . . ,. 0 This statute was enacted with the intent that federal
labor law would uniformly prevail over state labor law.' 5' However,
the United States Supreme Court has held that a state claim is pre-
empted by section 301 "only if such application requires the interpreta-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement.' ' 52
Preemption by section 301 of the LMRA is at issue when employ-
ees bring an action under the Wage Act seeking to recover compensa-
tion pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. While
the supreme court of appeals has acknowledged the principles of
LMRA preemption, the court consistently refuses to find preemption of
cases pursuant to the Wage Act in any given case.' 3 On the other
hand, federal courts considering claims pursuant to the Wage Act have
consistently held that such claims are preempted by section 301.54
Although the facts in these cases have varied, there is no tangible
explanation for the differences in the decisions, other than the pref-
erence for an expansive interpretation of the Wage Act expressed by
the supreme court of appeals.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
151. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), cited in Barton v. Creasey Co.
of Clarksburg, 718 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (N.D. W. Va. 1989).
152. Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
153. Ash v. Ravens Metal Products, Inc., 437 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 1993); Lowe v.
Imperial Colliery Co., 377 S.E.2il 652 (W. Va. 1985).
154. Barton v. Creasey Company of 'Clarksburg, 900 F.2d 249 (Table), 29 Wage and
Hour Cases (BNA) 1600 (4th Cir. 1990), affg 718 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. W. Va. 1989);
Briggs v. Heinz, U.S.A., 872 F.2d 416 (Table), 1989 WL 27483 (4th Cir. 1989).
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30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss3/8
WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT
In federal court, Briggs v. Heinz, U.S.A. involved former
employees' claims for unused personal leave days. 155 Provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement governed these benefits, but the
former employees brought an action pursuant to the Wage Act.'56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed
that the employees' claim against Heinz was based on a provision for
personal leave created by the collective bargaining agreement, and that
West Virginia did not create the right to be paid for such leave. Thus,
the Briggs court held that the state laws claims were preempted by
section 301 of the LMRA because the employees' rights to such bene-
fits presented questions for arbitration in accordance with the collective
bargaining agreement.15
7
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held that employees' claims pursuant
to the Wage Act for unpaid vacation and severance pay were preempt-
ed by section 301 in Barton v. Creasey Co. of Clarksburg.58 Af-
firming the decision of the district court, the Barton court relied on the
fact that the source of the rights to compensation at issue in the case
was the collective bargaining agreement and not state law. As the
court explained, "despite [plaintiffs'] assertions that their claims arise
wholly under the West Virginia statute, the [plaintiffs'] complaint in
state court shows that any substantive right they might have to recov-
ery of vacation and severance pay would require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement.'
' 59
In stark contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
declined to recognize LMRA section 301 preemption. For example, in
Ash v. Ravens Metal Products, Inc.,60 employees filed claims pursu-
ant to the Wage Act for recovery of accrued vacation pay allegedly
earned prior to the beginning of an extended labor dispute. The Ash
court concluded that no interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement was necessary because, as the court explained, "both sides
155. Briggs, 1989 WL 27483 *1.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *2.
158. Barton, 29 Wage and Hour Cases (BNA) 1600.
159. Id.
160. 437 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 1993).
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acknowledge that the agreement called for vacation pay to be remitted
if they worked one thousand hours in a year."'16 The court relied
heavy on language in the Supreme Court's Lingle decision that the ref-
erence in a state law claim to a collective bargaining agreement, with-
out any need for interpretation of the agreement, was permissible. 62
In the Ash case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also
relied on its previous decision in Lowe v. Imperial Colliery Co., in
which employees' claims under the Wage Act for vacation pay were
deemed not to be preempted by the LMRA. The Lowe court reasoned
that although the state law claims related to matters that were the
subject of collective bargaining, they were not preempted.163 Howev-
er, the court failed to discuss whether interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement was necessary.
The main difference between the state and federal court decisions
on this issue is that the federal courts recognize that the Act itself
does not confer substantive rights to compensation, and that any rights
to compensation are necessarily governed by the collective bargaining
agreement, subject to section 301 of the LMRA. The supreme court of
appeals, on the other hand, apparently views the Act as creating rights
separate from the collective bargaining agreement that are not preempt-
ed by the LMRA.
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974
ERISA governs the administration of employee benefits, including
pension, health care, and other employee benefit plans. 164 In addition,
ERISA prescribes specific remedies available for recovery of benefits
wrongfully withheld. 65 ERISA also includes a broad preemption pro-
vision stating that ERISA supersedes any state laws relating to "em-
ployee benefit plans.' 66 Therefore, to the extent that employees seek
161. Id. at 260.
162. Id. at 259.
163. Lowe, 377 S.E.2d at 658-59.
164. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). The term "employee benefit plan" means an employee
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to recover wages and benefits under the Wage Act, such actions may
be preempted by ERISA if the benefits sought are provided by an em-
ployer pursuant to an employee benefit plan.
Both state and federal cases interpreting the Wage Act use a simi-
lar analysis to determine whether ERISA preempts employees' claims
for benefits under the Wage Act. 67 Because of ERISA's broad pre-
emption provision, the issue is -whether the benefits at issue fall within
ERISA's definition of "employee benefit plan.' ' 168 For example, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
recently held that employees' claims seeking recovery of severance
benefits pursuant to the Act were preempted by ERISA. 169 The dis-
trict court determined that letters providing one month's severance pay,
extended medical coverage, and preferential hiring constituted sever-
ance benefits fell within ERISA's broad definition of employee benefit
plan. 170
Similarly, other severance pay plans, lay off allowances, and ac-
crued vacation pay plans have been found to be covered by ERISA in
cases where the employees' claims to recover such benefits under the
Wage Act were deemed to be preempted by ERISA.17 1 However, the
supreme court of appeals has determined that in order for ERISA
preemption to apply, the benefits at issue must be provided pursuant to
a preexisting plan relating to the administrative, funding, and payment
of such benefits.172
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3)
(1988). The term "employee welfare benefit plan" refers to plans for health insurance, dis-
ability, vacation and similar benefits, while the term "employee pension benefit plan" gener-
ally refers to plans for retirement benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1988).
167. Holland v. National Steel Corp., 791 F.2d 1132 (4th Cir. 1986); Tobin v.
Ravenswood Aluminum Corp., 1993 WL 485552 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); Southern v. Emery
Worldwide, 788 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. W. Va. 1992); Fox v. Union Carbide Corp., 400 S.E.2d
285 (W. Va. 1990); Lowe v. Imperial Colliery Co., 377 S.E.2d 652 (W. Va. 1989); Bailey
v. Sewell Coal Co., 110 Lab. Cases 55,991 (W. Va. 1988).
168. See supra note 166.
169. Tobin, 1993 WL 485552 *2.
170. Id.
171. Southern, 788 F. Supp. at 896; Fox, 400 S.E.2d. at 287-88.
172. Lowe, 377 S.E.2d at 656.
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IV. FuTTURE WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT ISSUES
As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia continues to
play an activist role in interpreting the Wage Act, a number of addi-
tional issues and theories of recovery lurk in the state circuit courts
and the administrative process. This section identifies selected issues
that may be addressed by courts in upcoming years, and suggests that
the Wage Act need not be a panacea for addressing perceived inequi-
ties in the employment relationship.
As previously discussed in the context of LMRA preemption, the
supreme court of appeals appears to have adopted the view that the
Wage Act itself creates substantive rights to compensation separately
from an employment contract or collective bargaining agreement. 7 1
Outside of that context, at least one group of plaintiffs attempted to
capitalize on this view. In a case in which appellate review was reject-
ed by the supreme court of appeals, a group of city employees brought
actions pursuant to the Wage Act based on contentions that they had
been compensated at an incorrect wage rate.
In Reeves v. Beckley, 74 city employees contended that as a re-
sult of being compensated at allegedly inappropriate wage rates, they
were entitled to recover wages, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees
pursuant to the Wage Act. In effect, the employees alleged that the
Wage Act provides a private cause of action to seek a higher rate of
pay. One difficulty with these claims is that the Wage Act merely sets
specific time requirements for payment of wages, not an entitlement to
any particular amount.1
75
173. See supra part III.D.1.
174. Reeves v. Beckley, No. 92-C-576-C (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Moore
v. Beckley, No. 92-C-585-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Boyden v. Beckley, No.
92-C-606-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Burnett v. Beckley, No. 92-C-711-B (Cir.
Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Harrington v. Beckley, No. 92-C-770-B (Cir. Ct, Raleigh
Co. May 28, 1993); Harbison v. Beckley, No. 92-C-793-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28,
1993); Plumley v. Beckley, No. 92-C-831-C (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993).
175. Barton v. Creasey Company of Clarksburg, 718 F. Supp. 1284, 1287 (N.D. W.
Va. 1989); Fox v. Union Carbide Corp., 400 S.E.2d 285 (W. Va. 1990).
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The circuit court granted the city's motion to dismiss the
employees' claims based on the conclusion that the city, as a munici-
pal corporation, is not subject to the Wage Act.176 The supreme court
of appeals has never addressed this issue. The circuit court's opinion
relies on the legislature's failure to specifically reference public entities
within the Wage Act's provisions. This failure to include municipal
corporations within the purview of the Wage Act is in contrast to
statutes that explicitly include public corporations such as the minimum
wage and maximum hours law and the statutory provisions relating to
polygraph tests.
177
Another issue creating claims against employers relates to sec-
tion 21-5-4 of the Wage Act, which governs the payment of compen-
sation to employees who have resigned or cease employment due to
termination, layoff, or a labor dispute. 78 As noted above, the wages
that must be paid to such employees within the time periods specified
in section 21-5-4 include "then accrued fringe benefits capable of
calculation and payable directly to an employee."' 79
However, section 21-5-4 also contains a proviso that states as
follows: "Provided, That nothing herein contained shall require fringe
benefits to be calculated contrary to any agreement between an em-
176. Reeves v. Beckley, No. 92-C-576-C (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Moore
v. Beckley, No. 92-C-585-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Boyden v. Beckley, No.
92-C-606-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Burnett v. Beckley, No. 92-C-711-B (Cir.
Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993); Harrington v. Beckley, No. 92-C-770-B (Cir. Ct. Raleigh
Co. May 28, 1993); Harbison v. Beckley, No. 92-C-793-A (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28,
1993); Plumley v. Beckley, No. 92-C-831-C (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Co. May 28, 1993).
177. Compare W. VA. CODE §§ 21-5-1 to -5, -6 to -16 (1989 & Supp. 1993) with W.
VA. CODE §§ 21-5-5a to -5d (1989) and W. VA. CODE § 21-5C-1 (1989). In addition to
the statutes cited by the circuit court (minimum wage and polygraph), a number of other
state statutes specifically include public entities. See Unemployment Compensation Law, W.
VA. CODE § 21A-1-3 (Supp. 1993); Workers' Compensation Act, W. VA. CODE § 23-2-1
(Supp. 1993); West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d) (Supp. 1993).
Moreover, in 1940, the Attorney General rendered the opinion that the assignment provision
of § 21-5-3 of the Act "is apparently not applicable to public employees or officers. It is
found that the labor provisions of our Code, and the history and background of these laws,
overwhelmingly indicate that their application is confined to private industry and labor em-
ployment generally." Op. Att'y Gen. 242 (1940).
178. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-4 (1989).
179. W. VA. CODE § 21-5-1(c) (1989). See supra part II.C.
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ployer and his employees which does not contradict the provision of
[the Act]."' 8 ° Courts have not yet interpreted the meaning or applica-
tion of this proviso, but a liberal interpretation provided by the Divi-
sion of Labor has created difficult issues for employers.
The section 21-5-4 proviso clearly recognizes that employers and
employees may agree as to the manner of calculation of fringe bene-
fits. While such agreements are sometimes by means of a collective
bargaining agreement, often the details as to fringe benefits are the
subject of personnel policies. Regardless of the source, such agree-
ments detail not only the manner of earning fringe benefits but also
the manner in which such fringe benefits may be used by employees.
However, the Division of Labor consistently takes the position that
any employment policy or agreement that effectively eliminates fringe
benefits once they are "capable of calculation" is invalid.'' For ex-
ample, some employers may permit unlimited accrual of sick or vaca-
tion time, but limit monetary compensation for such benefits at the
time of termination or resignation to a specified number of days. Other
employers may require a certain attendance record to maintain eligibili-
ty for sick or vacation time. These policies are subject to challenge,
according to the Division of Labor, at the time-of an employee's ter-
mination or resignation because they may limit the availability of com-
pensation for such accrued benefits.
Although the Division of Labor takes a dim view of such policies,
these are precisely the types of agreements contemplated by the plain
meaning of the section 21-5-4 proviso. Therefore, the Division of
Labor's aggressive view of the substantive rights of employees under
the Wage Act confronts employers with the unexpected costs of ben-
efits that were never extended to employees. Clearly, this interpretation
is an extension of employees' entitlement to compensation well beyond
the terms of the Act that should not be affirmed by any court. Howev-
er, the Farley case's theme that the terms of the Act are not a real
limitation poses a threat of future judicial legislation in this area.
180. W. VA. CODE § 21-4-5 (1989).
181. Reverence to the Division of Labor's approach to this issue is based on personal
observation and experience of the author. To date, the Division of Labor's view is not a
matter of reported opinion.
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Although the Farley decision is over thirteen years old, the West
Virginia Legislature has never amended the Wage Act or the
mechanics' lien statute to legitimize the Farley interpretation.
Therefore, the supreme court of appeals may continue to act as if it
has been conferred by the legislature with the authority to further
amend the Wage Act. On the other hand, advocates that refuse to
accept an approach that the Wage Act's provisions may be ignored
may prevail in convincing both the supreme court of appeals and other
courts that such a sweeping view is contrary to the purposes of legis-
lative and judicial processes. In the meantime, employers and entities
even remotely related to employers must continue to exercise caution
with regard to this evolving body of law.
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